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RFRA-VOTE GAMBLING: WHY PAULSEN
IS WRONG, AS USUAL
Suzanna Sherry*
Supreme Court currents are no less treacherous to navigators than are river currents-and, as Michael Paulsen himself has
previously pointed out, RFRA shares more than a linguistic
resonance with a river.1 Unfortunately, this time Paulsen has let
himself be fooled by the prevailing political winds into believing
that there will be smooth sailing for his favorite statute despite
the swirling eddies ahead. He is altogether too confident of a
favorable result.
Although I have no wagers, public or private (and I am
shocked-shocked!-to find gambling in this establishment) on
the outcome of Boeme v. Flores,I want to use my editorial prerogative to take issue with my colleague's predictions. Indeed,
he seems to have things exactly backward.
I start with the liberal wing of the Court, and the Justices
Paulsen seems to be most doubtful of: Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer. Together with Justice Souter, they would support RFRA
for at least two independent reasons. First, I am more confident
than Paulsen that all three would vote to overturn Smith; they
believe that RFRA incorporates a correct interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause. This is a good bet from the outset:
Smith supporters are few and far between. Among religion law
scholars, for example, opposition to Smith is one of the few issues
on which the left and the right generally agree. RFRA itself
passed Congress by an overwhelming (and strongly bi-partisan)
margin. Accommodation of religion can be viewed as either protective of religion (in which case it appeals to many conservatives) or protective of individual liberty (in which case it appeals

* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of
Minnesota.
1. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It Religious Freedom and the
U.S. Code, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 249 (1995).
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to many liberals). The combination is almost unbeatable: only a
few iconoclasts like me find Smith persuasive.2
Moreover, all three liberal Justices are likely to support a
reasonably broad Morgan power, and thus to allow Congress
some discretion even were Smith correctly decided. In particular,
they would likely support RFRA as a prophylactic measure
designed merely to prevent intentional religious discrimination,
which is banned by the First Amendment. They thus need not
reach the interesting question that Justice O'Connor might have
to consider about whose view of the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress is entitled to consult. (I'll get to that question later.) I
would count them as three sure votes to affirm.
Paulsen is too sure of the votes of the three conservative
Justices, however. He argues that any attack on RFRA would
require them to launch a jihad against Morgan. But these three
Justices have already launched their jihad against congressional
power, and destroying Morgan would fit right in. In United
States v. Lopez,3 in New York v. United States,4 and in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida,5 they abandoned prior precedent in order to
keep Congress within strict bounds. Add to this their support
(or, in the case of Justice Thomas, presumptive support) for the
result in Smith, and it seems highly unlikely that any of them will
vote to uphold the congressional attempt to nullify it. Paulsen's
ingenious suggestions on how to uphold RFRA while simultaneously distinguishing Smith, and still keeping the section five
power within bounds, are just a little too clever for these straightforward federalists. Count three votes to reverse the lower court
and invalidate RFRA.
And what of the middle? Paulsen is right to waffle on Justice
Stevens, and he is right about the reasons. Justice Stevens thinks
Smith is rightly decided, and seems to think that accommodation
is affirmatively unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.
He may be especially concerned to the extent that RFRA protects religious organizations, as such, rather than individual believers. Nevertheless, he also seems, at least these days, to
support a very broad power under Morgan. (He was not always
so sanguine about congressional power: his concurrence in Fitz2. See Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: ParadoxRedux, 1992 S. Ct. Rev. 123; William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.
308 (1991).
3. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
4. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
5. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
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patrick v. Bitzer suggested pretty strict limits on Congress's
power to redefine rights using section five.6)
So what's a Justice to do? The only error in Paulsen's analysis is that in Justice Stevens' view, Congress hasn't just done
something "manifestly stupid," it may have done something actually unconstitutional. But the "may have done" is the rub for me:
I'm no more certain than Paulsen that Justice Stevens will actually find RFRA unconstitutional as an Establishment Clause violation. Chalk up a probable but not certain vote to reverse the
lower court.
The count now stands at 4:3 to reverse, and the outcome
hinges on the very center of the Court. What makes this situation especially interesting is that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
are each in their own way pivotal votes. A recent game theoretic
analysis of Supreme Court voting behavior over the past two
terms has shown that Justice Kennedy is the most powerful Justice.7 Justice O'Connor-somewhat surprisingly-did not fare as
well under this analysis, but her tendency to write opinions that
split the difference among her colleagues makes her worth
watching on this one. Moreover, these two Justices don't seem to
be as determined to cripple Congress as their more conservative
brethren: they concurred separately in Lopez, adopting a much
milder tone. On the other hand, Justice O'Connor wrote (and
Kennedy joined) the majority opinion in New York v. United
States. She might view RFRA as a similar attempt by Congress
to force states to "govern according to Congress' instructions,"8
because it requires states to modify state laws. We might gain
some useful information when we see how they vote in Printz v.
United States,9 challenging the Brady Bill.
Thus on the question of congressional power, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are hard to predict. The best hope for supporters of RFRA is that these two Justices will try to avoid
confronting the section five question, and instead finesse it by
going along with the argument that RFRA is a prophylactic measure. The problem with that argument, for Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, is that there are no congressional findings to that effect. Their opinion in Lopez seems to suggest that at the very
least, Congress must contemporaneously justify its use of ques6. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
7. Paul H. Edelman and Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1997).
8.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).

9. 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted 64 U.S.L.W. 2169 (Sept. 26,1995) (No.
94-16940).
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tionable powers with empirical evidence.o It is not implausible
that Justice Kennedy might author an opinion striking down
RFRA with an implicit invitation to repass it with more extensive
congressional findings about the likelihood of religious discrimination. Nor is it implausible that he would uphold it as a prophylactic matter despite the lack of congressional findings. He could
go either way: let's call it at fifty-fifty.
As I mentioned earlier, Justice O'Connor faces one final interesting dilemma not faced by any other Justice. She alone simultaneously leans toward cabining congressional power but
overruling Smith. Assuming that there are not five votes to overrule Smith, she must answer the following question: if Congress is
limited to implementing the rights actually contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, should those rights be defined by the Court
as a whole or by each individual Justice? To put it another way,
Justice O'Connor agrees that the congressional interpretation of
free exercise rights is the constitutionally correct one, even
though a majority of the Court disagrees. As far as Justice
O'Connor is concerned, then, is Congress bound by the latter
view or may it rely on the former? I think a conscientious Justice
can answer either way. Cases from Cooper v. Aaron" to Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm12 suggest that the judiciary is a unified entity
whose ultimate voice is that of five or more Justices of the
Supreme Court. On that view, Justice O'Connor should judge
Congress against the voice of the judiciary, not against her own
view of the Constitution. On the other hand, of course, section
five gives Congress the power to enforce the FourteenthAmendment, not the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus if in Justice O'Connor's view Congress correctly
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no problem.
I think this is in fact the hardest and most interesting question raised by Flores,largely because it revisits the Cooper issues.
But Supreme Court Justices usually try to avoid hard and interesting questions, and I suspect that Justice O'Connor will do exactly that. She therefore has an added incentive, beyond the
uncertainty about Morgan that she shares with Justice Kennedy,
to go the prophylactic route. Count her as a probable
affirmance.
10. See Barry Friedman, Legislative Findingsand JudicialSignals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 757, 762 n.30 (1996).
11. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
12. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
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So we have one probable and three sure votes to reverse,
and the same number to affirm. It's all up to Justice Kennedy.
He truly is, as the game theorists have labelled him, The Most
Dangerous Justice. Either way, this is going to be a 5:4 nailbiter,
not a 7:2 blow-out. And, more important, even if Justice Kennedy votes to affirm, Paulsen is going to win another wager only
by narrowly construing the terms of the bet.13 Chip, you should
have learned from my mistake.

13. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 795, 797
(1993). Paulsen describes in Lemon is Dead his wager (with me) that the Court in Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) would not overrule Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). Although he concedes that Lemon is dead, he refuses to pay up because the
Court did not technically overrule it.
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